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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
HUGER SINKLERI *
While the number of cases involving constitutional law, which do
not also relate to other fields and are thus discussed elsewhere, are
few, the cases in this category are extremely interesting.
Perhaps the most interesting of these is the decision in the case
of the South Carolina Highway Department v. Harbin.1  In this
case the court held unconstitutional the so-called "point system"
which had been established by the Highway Department as a basis
for the revocation or suspension of driver's licenses. The court's
holding resulted from its conclusion that the statute relied upon by
the Highway Department to set up its system improperly delegated
legislative power. The specific statute involved is Code Section 46-
172.2 This Section reads:
46-172. Suspension or cancellation of license. For cause
satisfactory to the Department it may suspend, cancel or revoke
the driver's license of any person for a period of not more than
one year. Any person whose license has been suspended, can-
celled or revoked by the Department shall be notified of such
suspension, cancellation or revocation in writing by the Depart-
ment. Such notice shall be sent by registered mail to the last
address furnished the Department by such person. Within five
days thereafter such person shall return his license to the De-
partment and the failure on the part of any person to comply
with this provision shall be a misdemeanor and punishable as a
violation of this chapter as herein provided.
Harbin successfully contended that the statute fixed no standard
and laid down no intelligible guide to which the Department must
conform but left the matter in the uncontrolled discretion of the
Department which constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power.
The question of when the powers that are basically legislative in
nature may be delegated always results in perplexing problems. It
is well settled that while the Legislature may not delegate its power
to make laws, it may authorize an administrative agency or board to
fill up the details by prescribing rules and regulations for the com-
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plete operation and enforcement of the law. However, it has been
repeatedly held that such a statute must declare a positive legisla-
tive policy and establish standards for carrying it out, and that rules
and regulations must conform to the standards thus defined. In
this case the court held that Section 46-172 did not set out standards
which authorized the Highway Department to establish the system
which it placed into effect, relating to the suspension of driver's
licenses.
Viewed strictly from an academic standpoint, there can be not too
much quarrel with the holding of the court. Obviously, legislative
powers must be exercised by the legislative branch. However, when
the appalling number of deaths on the highways of this State are
computed every year, it is obvious that something must be done to
alleviate highway fatalities. It seems to be pretty well demonstrated,
at least as far as the public is concerned, that the point system evolved
by the Highway Department had a beneficial effect in reducing high-
way accidents. Furthermore, the death rate has risen since the sys-
tem was abandoned.
It is, therefore, to be hoped that the point system law enacted
during the 1955 session of the General Assembly will have a bene-
ficial effect. An examination of this statute indicates a careful com-
pliance with the court's holding. While the Highway Department
has been empowered to make rules and regulations for the admini-
stration of the new law, specific standards are established and a
positive legislative policy has been announced.
Conflict of General and Special Legislation
The case of the Town of Forest Acres v. the Town of "Forest Lake3
is of unusual interest. The case is a sequel to the case of the Town
of Forest Acres v. Seigler,4 decided by the Supreme Court during
1953, and discussed in the South Carolina Law Quarterly last year.
5
In the earlier case, the Town of Forest Lake unsuccessfully sought
to annex a portion of the Town of Forest Acres. That attempt was
defeated because of the failure to submit to the entire electorate of
Forest Acres the question of whether its corporate limits should be
reduced by the elimination of the area which sought to annex itself
to Forest Lake. In the Seigler case, the court properly concluded
that the applicable statutes meant that the voters of the entire town
should have a voice in determining whether any portion of the town
should be detached. The court stated that while it was true that
3. 226 S.C. 349, 85 S.E. 2d 192 (1954).
4. 224 S.C. 166, 77 S.E. 2d 900 (1953).
5. 7 S.C.L.Q. 156 (Fall 1954).
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only in rare instances would the voters of a town agree to release a
portion of its territories so as to permit annexation to another muni-
cipality, nevertheless, that was a matter for the Legislature and not
for the courts. Evidently, those who sponsor the affairs of the
Town of Forest Lake were not long in acting upon the suggestion
made by the court, for promptly in the year 1954 there was enacted a
special law relating to towns in counties with a city whose population,
according to the 1950 census, was 85,000 or more. Quite obviously
this related to Richland County and no where else. This statute pro-
vides that if the town, a portion of whose area was to be annexed,
had outstanding no bonds or contractual obligations payable trom
taxes, and if the area of the town was owned by a corporation, that
an annexation might follow a petition on the part of the owner of
the area which wished to leave the first town and become a part of
the second town. The statute provided that no election was to be
required. The Town of Forest Acres attacked an annexation pro-
ceeding under this Act on the ground that the Act was unconstitu-
tional as being a special law where a general law was applicable.
The court sustained this contention. It noted that there was a statute
which was a general law which did prescribe the method by which
municipal corporations might extend their territories through annexa-
tion, and it held that the Act in question was a radical departure
from the general law, without any rational basis for distinction.
The court's decision is well reasoned. Obviously, the constitutional
provision condemning special laws where a general law is applicable
would have little meaning if an Act of this sort should be permitted
to stand.
The court noted the contention of the Town of Forest Acres that
the Act was violative of Section 1, Article 8, of the South Carolina
Constitution, which provides the powers of municipalities within a
given class must be similar to the powers of all other municipal cor-
porations of that class. While the court did not see fit to pass
upon this contention, it would appear that this position is equally
well taken. Obviously, if a town in Richland County could annex
in the manner provided for by the Act, it has been given powers
which are not applicable to other towns of the same class elsewhere
in the State.
Regulation of Public Utilities by the State
The case of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. The South Caro-
lina Public Service Conmmission6 relates to the validity and reason-
6. 226 S.C. 136, 84 S.E. 2d 132 (1954).
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ableness of an order of the Public Service Commission requiring the
Railroad Company to enlarge a certain railroad station platform. The
Railroad Company contended that there was no need for a platform
as large as that sought for. The Public Service Commission found
against this contention, and the court's holding was to the effect that
the Public Service Commission's order must be upheld unless it were
conclusively established that its holding was clearly against the weight
of the evidence. The court reached the conclusion that in this case
the evidence was such that the holding could not be said to be clearly
against the weight of the evidence.
The case here is not one of great importance, and it merely reiter-
ates the well established rule that public utilities are subject to
regulation through the exercise of the police power of the State.
While it is perhaps true that the Railroad Company does not agree
with the result of this case, it would seem that neither side could
have any real quarrel as to the correctness of the law which was laid
down.
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